Who Will Be Russia's Best Friend? by Felgenhauer, Pavel
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy Perspective
2002-09
Who Will Be Russia's Best Friend?
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/3602
Boston University
PERSPECTIVE
Volume 13, No 1 (September-October 2002)
Who Will Be Russia’s Best Friend?
By PAVEL FELGENHAUER(1) 
A year ago, after the 9/11 jet terrorist attacks on America, Russia's President Vladimir 
Putin was the first world leader to offer condolence by phone to President George W. 
Bush. When the United States decided to attack and overthrow the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, Russia allowed the use of its airspace to fly supplies and troops into 
Central Asia. Putin also permitted the stationing of US soldiers in former Soviet bases in 
Central Asia -- against the expressed opinion of most of his military commanders.
Moscow supplied tanks and sizable amounts of other heavy military equipment, 
together with tons of munitions, fuel and spare parts to the anti-Taliban Northern 
Alliance (2) in Afghanistan. Moscow shared with Washington intelligence information 
and its Afghan experience, as well as contacts with its allies inside Afghanistan. Russian 
military supplies were used in organizing a robust ground offensive by united Afghan 
anti-Taliban forces that in cohesion with US air attacks and special forces operations 
toppled the al-Qaeda-backed regime.
Such US-Russian linked actions in Afghanistan were followed by Putin's decision to 
close a Soviet base in Cuba that spied on the United States, and a naval base in 
Vietnam. Many observers, who for years had advocated a long-term, strategic alliance 
between Russia and the West, believed that Putin at long last had made a resolute 
decision: to part with previous policies of having evenhanded partnerships with the US 
and Europe, on the one side, and rogue anti-Western regimes on the other (the 
"multipolar world" foreign policy doctrine of former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov).
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After the Afghanistan successes, Washington did its best to convince the Kremlin to 
"reconsider" its relations with Iran. In January 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State 
John Wolf came to Moscow to discuss nonproliferation, accompanied by a large 
delegation, including officials from the energy and defense departments. The Iran 
connection in fact was one of the main issues under discussion.
The US team insisted that, after 11 September, fundamental changes in relations were 
taking place and there was a major convergence of interests between Russia and the 
US. Iran actively supports terrorism and is aspiring to obtain nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missile technologies, the Americans stressed. Therefore, Moscow should not 
supply Tehran with such capabilities.
In this initial major US-Russian discussion of the Iran connection after the September 
attacks, members of the Wolf delegation acknowledged that Moscow has a special 
relationship with Tehran. However, it argued also that "there are other fields for Russia 
to make economic gains, than transferring weapons and nuclear technologies to Iran."
Wolf offered Russia different possible compensations, if it "reconsidered" its Iran link. At 
the same time, it was pointed out that Iran was not a side issue -- there was a number 
of laws passed by Congress that would not go away while Russia continued with Iran. 
US-Russian relations "cannot move forward while Russia is still closely involved with 
Iran and Iran is supporting terrorism and aspiring to nuclear weapons," US diplomats 
stressed.
However, the Wolf mission did not make much progress on the Russia-Iran issue. It was 
assumed in Washington that a number of individuals in Moscow, especially in the 
foreign ministry, did not yet "get the message" that relations between the two former 
Cold War adversaries had changed fundamentally. Therefore, the issue was promoted 
to the agenda of the two presidents at the May 2002 summit in Moscow -- to bypass 
those rigid, middle-level Soviet-style bureaucrats (as it was viewed in Washington). US 
representatives, moreover, spelled out in detail the advantages Russia might gain if it 
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ceased its trade in nuclear technology and arms with Iran, hoping thus to seduce not 
only the Kremlin, but Russian companies and organizations, to abandon their ties with 
Iran.
A high-ranking US diplomat, directly involved in promoting a bargain that would involve 
a "reconsideration" of the Russo-Iranian link, gave me some of the details: The US 
military in Afghanistan was encountering difficulties using its transport helicopters. The 
mountains are high, the air is sparse, hot and dusty, and regular transport choppers 
were having problems taking payloads to high-altitude battlefields, where the US troops 
and their allies were trying to eliminate the "pockets" of al-Qaeda and Taliban diehards.
At the same time American soldiers had gained some experience flying in (Northern 
Alliance) Soviet-made Mi-8 helicopters, specially designed for use in Afghanistan. In the 
1980s, the Soviets in Afghanistan had run into the same difficulties with military 
choppers built during the Cold War to fight in the European theater. Consequently, 
special "Afghan" helicopter modifications were made with enhanced engines -- planes 
that could fly easily at an altitude of 4km and even managed to fly over 5km-high 
mountain ridges, going at full speed.
The Pentagon was ready to purchase a number of Russian-made "Afghan" design 
helicopters -- but only after Moscow contracts its ties with Tehran, the US official said.
Washington was prepared, moreover, to order NASA to procure more services from the 
Russian space agency and to pay for some of the work on the International Space 
Agency that up to now the Russians had been doing for free. The only obstacle was the 
Iranian link.
Last year, the Russian parliament passed a law allowing the import and storing of 
foreign nuclear waste -- to the tune of up to $20 billion in 20 years. A year has passed 
and not a single barrel of foreign waste has arrived. Taiwan was viewed as the first 
major radioactive import source by proponents of the nuclear waste legislation. Taiwan 
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has a number of nuclear power stations and sizeable amounts of waste it wishes to 
move. However, the Taiwan reactors are US-made and Washington has veto power 
over any future use of the spent nuclear fuel.
"I believe it's a good idea for Russia to take nuclear waste, store it somewhere in its 
vast wilderness and earn billions of dollars. But we will block the Taiwan deal and not 
allow the Russian Nuclear Power Ministry to earn the money while it continues to build 
the nuclear power reactor in Iran at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf," a US official told me.
The US incentives were clearly designed to appease specific Russian interest groups. 
The prospective helicopter deal should have modified the attitude of the military-
industrial complex that was planning to sell Iran jets, as well as anti-ship and anti-
aircraft missiles. More money from NASA should have made the Russian space agency 
happy and helped to stop ballistic missile technology transfers. The nuclear waste from 
Taiwan prospective was designed to make the nuclear power ministry abandon the 
Bushehr project.
However, the incentives did not work. The main problem in trying to "pay off" Moscow 
for "good behavior" and to reimburse it for losses it may encounter when it scraps 
multibillion-dollar deals with rogue states is that even if, on balance, Russia as a state 
were to end up in the black, specific influential figures and entities, deeply involved in 
deals with Iran, might obtain little or no compensation at all.
Arms sales and nuclear transfer deals are totally nontransparent, especially if 
undemocratic (rogue) regimes are involved. If the Pentagon or NASA were to procure 
something in Russia, under the watchful eye of the US public accounting services, 
embezzlement would be much harder to carry off, than when uranium isotope 
purification equipment, or nuclear reactors, or arms, are shipped to, say, Iran or China.
Weapons, nuclear materials, and equipment that are exported or planned for sale in the 
coming years all are Soviet in origin. Most of the materials and equipment in fact was 
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produced in Soviet times and today is merely repainted or refurbished and then sold as 
new. The "production cost" of such repainted, sometimes second-hand items, is 
negligible, compared to the price tag foreigners pay. The "producers" pay virtually no 
taxes, pretending all the material was newly made and, because of the supposedly high 
costs, the sale did not generate much profit. Thus, few if any taxes are owed.
Of course, the authorities, the Kremlin, even the buyers are aware of this scam, but 
none of them cares: For their money, the rogue states obtain usable Soviet-made 
weapons or nuclear equipment. The massive unofficial profits are shared out as bribes, 
with Kremlin officials, allegedly, pocketing the lion's cut. Foreign officials often also 
obtain their portion of cash kickback.
Now imagine a high-ranking Russian official who is expected to approve, gratis, a clean 
transparent multimillion- (or even multibillion-) dollar deal with a US government agency 
in return for scrapping an opaque multibillion-dollar agreement with good old pals in 
Baghdad, or Tehran, or Tripoli, or Damascus. What will be his response? Most likely 
he'll do his best to shoot down the US-sponsored initiative through bureaucratic 
intrigues, while, at the same time, leaking anti-American stories to pet journalists, in 
order to provide a plausible political pretext for his actions.
Led by self-interest and, no doubt, by inner ideological predisposition, generals, 
diplomats, arms makers and nuclear technology traders, oligarchies that do not want 
Russia to be truly open to the world, with high-ranking bureaucrats and prominent 
journalists on their payroll -- all want to distance Russia from the West. These forces 
have been extremely active in recent months, doing their best to sour relations with the 
West in general and the US in particular.
Russian diplomats and officials have induced the Kremlin to take an uncompromising 
stand on the Kaliningrad transit visa issue, arguing that if Putin banged on the table, the 
West immediately would compromise on Russia's terms -- a forecast that, of course, did 
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not pan out. The idea, apparently, was to make Putin angry over Western 
"intransigence."
Moscow has announced its intention to sign a long-term $30 billion cooperation deal 
with Iraq -- an attempt, obviously, to prop up a regime that the US is intent on 
overthrowing. Kremlin insiders allege that a pro-Saddam oil lobby, led by Russia's top oil 
firm LUKOIL, is exerting undue influence over the Russian foreign ministry, which 
recently has been intensifying its rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein.
Moscow also has been signing additional arms trade deals with China and Iran, 
pledging to sell high-capability jets, sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles that 
may be used against US forces in the Gulf and around Taiwan.
On 23 August, Russian jets bombed Georgian territory, killing one man and wounding 
seven other Georgian civilians. Russian officials adamantly denied any involvement. 
Two days later White House spokesman Ari Fleischer in effect publicly accused Russian 
officials of lying about the attack on Georgia. Fleischer also charged Russia with 
"escalating tensions" in the region and added, "we call again urgently for a political 
settlement to the conflict in Chechnya."
The anti-American lobby seems to have been working quite successfully this summer. 
From the Black Sea in the west to the Yellow Sea in the east -- virtually through the 
entire "arch of instability" -- Russia and the US today are opposing each other, albeit 
indirectly, through proxies, but still very much as in the good old days of the Cold War. 
Even in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban -- the common US and Russian enemy 
-- operational "antiterrorist" cohesion is not at all as close as before.
I, personally, as a citizen of Russia, am very pleased that this rift has postponed, for the 
time being, the import of Taiwan's radioactive waste into my country. However, in all 
other respects the partial restoration of the anti-Western "multipolar world" policy is 
clearly to Russia's long-term detriment. Even the "elite" in Moscow, that is lining its 
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pockets with illegal proceeds from arms deals with anti-American states, knows that this 
garage sale will be over in a few years, when there no longer will be much Soviet 
material left to peddle. Actually many (including Putin himself) reiterate (and perhaps 
understand) that "the future of Russia is with the West." However, then another rogue 
state knocks on the door, offering a multibillion-dollar "cooperation agreement" and, on 
top of that, well-placed bribes to persons that matter, so that, once again, "the future of 
Russia" is postponed.
Notes:
1 Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst based in Moscow.
2 Previously aligned with Russia.
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